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Abstract 
 Although scientific reasoning is usually deliberate, it may also be influenced by the 
intuitive processes involved in everyday reasoning. Here, I investigated whether explanatory 
heuristic processes biased towards inherence (that is, the tendency to oversample easily-
accessible inherent facts; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014) influence scientific explanation. Across 
seven studies, children and adults (N = 1,455) explained outcomes of unfamiliar experiments in 
physics, biology, and chemistry predominantly in terms of inherent features. These inherence-
biased explanations exhibited multiple signatures of heuristic reasoning (e.g., they decreased 
with age and time spent deliberating). Strikingly, I also found traces of this bias toward 
inherence in initial explanations of phenomena from the history of science (e.g., phlogiston 
explains combustion); these historical explanations were obtained via a survey of historians of 
science and were coded by hypothesis-blind researchers. These findings suggest that scientific 
explanation may be influenced by the same inherence heuristic that biases everyday explanation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1827, Scottish biologist Robert Brown was investigating the physical properties of flower 
pollen. During one series of studies in which he placed pollen suspended in water under a 
microscope, Brown observed that the pollen particles were rapidly zigzagging about. This was 
surprising to Brown, although similar events had been observed previously in other organic 
substances. The explanation for this phenomenon was thought to be well understood by other 
scientists – the motion of these molecules was due to a “vital force” present in living matter. 
Brown independently came to a similar conclusion: In Brown’s own words, “These motions … 
arose neither from current in the fluid nor from its gradual evaporation, but belonged to the 
particle itself.” However, as Brown pursued this line of reasoning further, he noticed 
inconsistencies between this explanation and the data. Brown noticed that when he tried the same 
experiment with inorganic particles he still observed this zigzagging motion. He realized that if 
the pollen’s motion was due to the presence of an inherent property of organic materials then 
inorganic materials—which were assumed to lack such a property—should not exhibit the same 
behavior. That is, upon reflection, Brown realized that the motion of the pollen was not due to 
something inherent to the pollen but instead to some other factor acting on the pollen. Brown 
attempted to rule out other alternative hypotheses that could explain the pollen’s motion, 
including checking whether his equipment was faulty, but it was not until the work of Einstein 
and Smoluchowski that it was discovered that the pollen’s motion was caused by the rapid 
motion of submicroscopic particles in a solvent pushing the pollen about.  
Although Brown eventually realized his initial explanation of the motion of the pollen 
particles was incorrect, his first attempt at understanding their motion was closer to an 
explanatory guess than it was to a well-reasoned explanation. Brown is not alone in his reliance 
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on explanatory guesses. There is considerable research that suggests that adults and children 
alike appear to rely on intuitive guesses to understand the world (see Driver et al., 2005 for a 
review). In an effort to understand the source of scientists’ and laypeople’s explanatory guesses, 
psychologists have begun to investigate the cognitive mechanisms and contours of explanatory 
reasoning (e.g., Gopnik, 1998; Keil, 2006; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2011; Lombrozo, 2006; 
Murphy & Medin, 1985; Premack & Premack, 1996; Ross, 1977; Weiner, 1985).  
Initial research on explanatory reasoning aimed to elucidate how people reconcile their 
intuitive understanding of the world with new evidence they acquire both inside and outside of 
the classroom (e.g., Brewer et al., 1998; Driver et al., 2005). More recently, however, research 
on explanatory reasoning has concerned how people evaluate explanations. For instance, 
researchers aimed to answer questions about the properties that good explanations have (e.g., 
Lombrozo, 2006; Lombrozo, 2007; Wilson & Keil, 1998), or what laypeople and practicing 
scientists think constitutes an intelligible explanation of a scientific observation (e.g., Waskan et 
al., 2014; Wilkenfeld et al., 2016).  
While considerable advances have been made in understanding explanatory reasoning, 
researchers have now begun developing theoretical models aimed at describing the process of 
explanatory reasoning (e.g., Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2013; also 
see Holyoak & Thagard, 1996; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). Still, despite the centrality of 
explanatory reasoning to cognition, much remains unknown about its underlying cognitive 
mechanism. 
In this dissertation, I aim to investigate and understand the cognitive processes 
underlying explanatory reasoning in the domain of science. Specifically, I investigate the 
hypothesis that there is a domain-general intuitive bias that affects scientific explanation. I will 
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propose that that people’s explanations of scientific phenomena will tend to exhibit an inherence 
(rather than extrinsicness) bias rooted in a heuristic cognitive process: I will argue that people’s 
explanations will often invoke inherent facts about the observation to be explained rather than 
appealing to extrinsic factors operating on those entities. To return to the example of Brownian 
motion, I hypothesize that when confronted with a scientific phenomenon (e.g., the motion of 
pollen in a solvent) people will tend to explain the phenomenon in terms of the features of 
entities in the pattern (e.g., the inherent properties of the pollen) rather than facts extrinsic to the 
pattern (e.g., the motion of particles in the water acting on the pollen).  
I motivate this prediction by considering several lines of research, including (1) findings 
that suggest general principles like heuristic processing, knowledge activation, and relational 
reasoning predict an inherence bias in explanation and (2) findings that people’s explanations of 
everyday social patterns exhibit an inherence bias. After motivating this prediction, I discuss the 
results of nine studies that test the prediction that scientific explanation exhibits an inherence 
bias rooted in a heuristic cognitive process.  
An inherence bias in explanation 
Constructing explanations is an enormously complex computational task. Whether it be 
about the mysterious motion of pollen under a microscope or everyday social patterns, reasoners 
must access vast amounts of conceptual and relational knowledge encoded in semantic memory 
and combine relevant portions of that knowledge to produce a plausible account of why an event 
occurred. Yet, people often explain observations rapidly even in the face of anomalous 
experiences. But it is also clear that our initial explanatory guesses are often incorrect: even 
Robert Brown, a thoughtful botanist fell prey to his initial, but incorrect, explanatory guess. 
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However, the ways in which our explanatory hunches are incorrect shed light on the cognitive 
processes underlying how we construct explanations in a quick and effortless fashion.  
Cimpian and Salomon (2014) recently articulated a theoretical account explaining the 
apparent effortlessness of explanatory reasoning. They argue that people produce initial 
explanations heuristically and that these explanations are characterized by their over-reliance on 
inherent facts (that is, facts about the way an object is in and of itself) rather than extrinsic facts 
(that is, facts that are dependent on other entities or broader interactions with the world).1 
Cimpian and Salomon argue that when reasoners attempt to make sense of some observation 
(e.g., that people drink orange juice for breakfast), they explain those patterns in terms of 
inherent facts about the entities involved in the pattern (e.g., the tanginess of orange juice) 
instead of extrinsic facts, like the context and history of the entities in the pattern (e.g., the 
promotion of oranges by crop growers).  
Cimpian and Salomon posit that the overreliance of inherent features in explanation 
follows from general principles that govern heuristic processing (e.g., Evans, 2006; Kahneman, 
2011; Stanovich & West, 2000), knowledge activation (e.g., Higgins, 1996), and relational 
reasoning (e.g., Halford et al., 1998). They hypothesize that when reasoners search for an 
explanation (e.g., Why do people drink orange juice for breakfast?), the main entities of the 
phenomenon to be explained (orange juice) become active in working memory. Active memories 
often provide relevant clues for the problem at hand (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Hummel & Holyoak, 
2003). As a result, when people retrieve information relevant to generating an explanation, they 
may oversample information about these salient entities. As inherent properties are a part of the 
representation of these entities in semantic memory (e.g., McRae & Jones, 2013; Rosch & 
																																								 																				
1 It should be noted, however, that inherent facts need not be centrally important to what an object is, but merely a 
property such that if it was changed, it would change the object. 
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Mervis, 1975), and are thus easily accessible to retrieval processes, Cimpian and Salomon 
hypothesize that these properties will often dominate what is retrieved to generate an 
explanation. Further, Cimpian and Salomon (2014) have argued that even when extrinsic facts 
are retrieved, they are more relationally complex (and thus cognitively complex) than inherent 
facts—extrinsic explanations entail an interaction between the environment and the pattern to be 
explained (e.g., Halford et al., 1998; Maybery et al., 1986; Waltz et al., 1999; Waltz et al., 2000). 
Thus, using extrinsic facts to produce an explanation is more cognitively demanding than using 
inherent facts to produce an explanation. Together, these general principles that govern heuristic 
processing, knowledge activation, and relational reasoning predict a bias towards inherence in 
explanatory reasoning.2 
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the inherence heuristic proposed in Cimpian and Salomon 
(2014). 
The corresponding imbalance in the properties that are explanatorily relevant have 
important consequences for downstream processing: When the cognitive system goes on to 
assemble an explanation, its output will be correspondingly skewed towards explanatory 
intuitions that appeal to the inherent features of the relevant focal entities (e.g., the tanginess of 
orange juice).  If the content retrieved initially is inherence-skewed, is part of the semantic 
representation of what is active in working-memory, and is less relationally complex (and thus 
																																								 																				
2	This account is consistent with findings indicating that, for instance, children have early emerging skeletal 
frameworks that affect their understanding of physical phenomena. Indeed, the present proposal is derived from 
foundational findings of this sort rather than being in competition with them.	
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easier to use when producing an explanation) then the options of the assembly stage will be 
affected accordingly. Note that this claim does not entail that the cognitive architecture “prefers” 
inherent explanations because they are inherent. Instead, inherent facts are what happen to be 
accessible and this in turn leads to an inherence bias in explanatory reasoning; the bias towards 
inherence is a structural by-product rather than a preference of our mental architecture.  
As noted, despite the obvious shortcuts built into the inherence heuristic process, the 
intuitions it generates may be generally adopted without much scrutiny, as is the case with the 
output of other heuristic processes: Extensive evidence suggests that humans often take the path 
of least cognitive effort, routinely “satisficing” rather than striving for accuracy (Evans, 2006; 
see also Simon, 1982). Thus, as long as the explanations generated by the inherence heuristic 
pass a threshold of plausibility, they may be readily accepted as correct and therefore shape one’s 
general understanding of the world (beyond the particular circumstance or event that may have 
triggered the search for an explanation). In other words, the explanations produced using this 
heuristic process serve as a rough sketch of a complex causal mechanism whose answer is not 
already known, but this sketch suffices to satisfy reasoners’ cognitive drive to explain.  
However, the scope of the inherence heuristic is not all encompassing. Rather, it is 
limited to the domain where heuristics are necessary to efficiently navigate the world—that is, 
situations in which very complex problems require knowledge of difficult to access information 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). For instance, the heuristic account of explanation is not aimed 
providing an account of situations in which one could simply retrieve answers from memory. 
As a theoretical framework, the inherence heuristic proposal has proved extremely 
fruitful. In several sets of studies, researchers have found that people’s explanations of, for 
instance, social patterns exhibit an inherence bias and this bias is linked to intuitive reasoning 
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processes (e.g., Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Hussak & Cimpian, 
2015; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2015; Tworek & Cimpian, 2016).3  However, although the 
inherence heuristic process has now been shown to be extensively involved in people’s 
explanations of everyday phenomena, there has been notably little research on its potential 
influence in one major domain in which explanation plays a particularly significant role: 
scientific reasoning. Given the centrality of explanation to the history and philosophy of science, 
and the importance of science inside and outside the classroom, one open question is whether the 
cognitive mechanisms that influence everyday explanation, specifically those related to the 
inherence bias in explanation, likewise play a role in the formation of scientific explanations.  
Do scientific explanations also exhibit an inherence bias and is this bias rooted in 
heuristic processes? From a normative perspective—that is, if we note how science ought to be 
conducted—the answer may seem obvious: Science relies on methods which are data driven, 
deliberative, and thus free of intuitions, heuristic processes, and the like. A priori, it seems 
unlikely that scientific explanation would be affected by inherence-biased heuristic processes. 
However, descriptively—that is, if we examine how science is actually conducted in the lab—the 
answer is less obvious: While science is often a deliberative enterprise conducted by people that 
spend many years of their lives attempting to make sense of complex phenomena, it isn’t entirely 
divorced from the psychological constraints of its practitioners (e.g., Dunbar, 1997; Yu et al., 
2014). Returning to the example of Brown, despite the centrality of deliberation to Brown’s 
reasoning, his initial explanation—which appears to have been less well thought-out and more of 
																																								 																				
3 These findings and the inherence heuristic proposal do not entail, however, that experience over the course of a 
person’s life is irrelevant to the degree to which they might produce inherence biased explanations. Rather, the 
proposal is that overriding this prepotent bias towards inherent explanations requires effort, education, or cultural 
immersion. This claim is consistent with results from cross-cultural psychology showing that young children across 
cultures tend to endorse essentialist beliefs (a kind of inherent belief) but that, as they develop, the contours of these 
essentialist attitudes change in response to learning, education, and cultural input.  
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a gut explanatory guess—served as his theoretical starting place and informed much of his 
subsequent theorizing and experimentation.  
My hypothesis is that science, as it is conducted, is likely to exhibit an inherence bias 
rooted in heuristic cognitive processes. In the next section of the paper, I discuss several 
empirical findings that suggest, under some circumstances, intuitive biases influence scientific 
explanation.  In light of the evidence I will discuss, along with prior work showing an inherence 
bias in everyday explanation, I predict that scientific explanation will exhibit a pervasive 
inherence bias in situations in which scientists need to rely on intuitions to begin to make 
explanatory inroads as they attempt to explain novel complex scientific phenomena.  
Intuitive biases in scientific explanation 
Many of the research studies [on science learning] refer to the way in which learned ideas 
are not applied by pupils when they reflect upon experience: they fall back upon their 
prior, lay ideas which have been retained alongside learned science. – Driver, Squires, 
Rushworth, and Woods-Robinson (2005). 
 
Explanations of everyday phenomena are often shallow (Keil, 2006; Rozenblit & Keil, 
2002), generated quickly (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014), and exhibit predictable biases in content 
(Sutherland & Cimpian, 2015; Tworek & Cimpian, 2016). However, much of the work 
documenting shortcuts and flaws in explanatory reasoning has not been performed in contexts 
that necessarily demand thoughtful deliberation, such as scientific inquiry. Thus, these findings 
do not directly indicate that intuitive biases will affect people’s explanations of scientific 
phenomena. In fact, there are even reasons to believe that such biases will not be present in 
scientific reasoning, since a key part of what makes science so successful is its reliance on 
careful deliberation. There is a sizable literature on the mechanisms underlying the deliberative 
reasoning processes that go on in the lab, including how insight thinking and analogical 
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inference lead to scientific breakthroughs (e.g., Holyoak & Thagard, 1996; Nersessian, 1992). 
For example, researchers have argued that analogical reasoning allowed scientists to begin to 
make sense of atomic structure: Predicating that the atom is like the solar system allowed 
scientists to begin to reason about a target domain (atoms) based on a more well understood 
source domain (the solar system). This relational mapping allowed scientists to make 
explanatory inroads into an unobservable and wholly mysterious target domain. Further, 
scientists typically describe scientific phenomena in the language of mathematics – an 
undoubtedly rational tool. Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that scientific reasoning is by 
and large, if not entirely, a rational, deliberative exercise unaffected by cognitive biases and 
psychological constraints. 
However, even in the context of a deliberative exercise such as analogical reasoning, for 
example, psychological constraints unambiguously affect how practicing scientists explain 
phenomena. For example, Dunbar (1997) found that even in world-class biology labs, analogies 
tended to be “local”, relying on featural similarity of a source and target, rather than abstract 
(such as the solar system – atomic structure analogy) (Chen & Klahr, 1999). Findings such as 
these suggest that even in a characteristically rational enterprise, cognitive limitations can 
impose constraints on the kinds of explanations scientists are likely to produce, at least on a first 
pass.  
In fact, there is substantial evidence that intuitive processes shape both children’s and 
adults’ explanations of scientific phenomena. Although a full overview of this literature is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation (see Driver, Squires, Rushworth & Wood-Robinson, 2005, 
for a review), I will now discuss some influential findings that show how biases make their way 
into people’s understanding of scientific phenomena. These findings suggest that when children 
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and adults first begin to understand scientific phenomena, they bring to bear intuitive theories 
and rely on cognitive shortcuts to deal with the complexity of the phenomena they are attempting 
to understand. I begin by discussing several prominent findings in detail and then provide a brief 
summary of several other findings from this literature.  
 Some of the most influential work on how intuitive biases shape scientific understanding 
comes from McCloskey and Kohl (1983). McCloskey investigated how naïve theories shape 
high school and college students’ explanations and predictions about the dynamics of objects. 
McCloskey showed that people explain dynamics in terms quite similar to the theory of impetus 
– a revised theory of Aristotelian dynamics according to which, when an object is thrown, for 
example, it acquires a kind of internal force from the thrower that ensures the object will 
continue to move. As the object soars through the air, the impetus within the object dissipates 
causing it to fall. Strikingly, high school and college students believe that objects have a kind of 
impetus instilled in them by the actions of an agent hurling or swinging those objects. For 
example, McCloskey had participants judge the motion of an object after it was swung around in 
a circle on a rope. He found that, rather than believing the object will proceed in a straight line 
once released, people expected that the object will continue to curve. When asked to explain this 
prediction, people appealed to an impetus-like idea that the circular motion had been imparted to 
the object (also see Driver & Erikson, 1983; Driver et al., 2005; Halloun & Hestenes, 1985).  
Intuitive theories affect people’s explanations and understanding of scientific phenomena 
not just in adulthood but also early in life. For example, Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) 
investigated children’s conceptions of the Earth’s shape and how they change over the course of 
elementary school (also see Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). Vosniadou and Brewer proposed that 
children have naïve theories about the shape of the Earth – namely, that it is flat. However, when 
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children learn that the Earth is in fact a sphere floating in space, they are left to reconcile their 
intuitive theory with the new information that they’ve acquired. In one particularly striking study 
of how children reconcile these conflicting ideas, Vosniadou and Brewer found that, for 
example, children would draw the Earth as a sphere with only the top “flat part” of the Earth 
containing the properties we associate with the Earth (viz. having the sun, moon, stars, oceans 
and so forth – see Figure 1, Panel C below).  
 
 
Figure 2. Drawings of the Earth, moon and stars from children in Vosniadou & Brewer (1992). 
The figure depicts children’s attempt to reconcile their intuitive notions that the Earth is flat with 
new information they’ve acquired in school that the Earth is a sphere floating in space.  
Beyond these specific examples in the domain of physics, researchers have shown that 
intuitive biases shape people’s understanding of light, sound, and heat (Driver et al., 2005) 
among many other phenomena. 
The idea that intuitive notions influence children’s explanations of scientific phenomena 
extend beyond the domain of physics. Indeed, there has been a significant amount of research on 
intuitive but mistaken biological (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994) and chemical 
(e.g., Leslie, 2013) conceptions. For example, Inagaki and Hatano demonstrated that children 
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understand and interpret living entities in terms of vitalistic causality – a “vital power” attributed 
to biological entities which is conceptualized by children as an essential substance or energy (see 
Gelman, 2003).  
In sum, there is considerable evidence explanations of scientific phenomena are 
influenced by intuitive understanding of the world among both adults (not just naïve adults but 
also practicing scientists) and children. Although much of this literature has focused on domain-
specific intuitive biases, I hypothesize that there is a domain-general intuitive bias that affects 
scientific explanation. Although scientific explanation may often be a deliberative enterprise, 
vestiges of the intuitive processes underlying everyday explanation may systematically affect the 
beliefs people form when they begin to understand scientific phenomena. In the remainder of the 
paper, I directly test this proposal in a series of studies examining adults and children’s 
explanations of scientific phenomena. 
Predictions for Studies 1 - 8 
I conducted 8 studies to examine the proposed influence of a domain-general heuristic 
process biased towards inherence on scientific explanation. In Studies 1 and 2, I examined 
whether scientific explanation among naïve adults exhibits an inherence bias. I predicted that 
participants would explain scientific observations in chemistry, physics, and biology in terms of 
the inherent features of the entities in the observation, even when plausible extrinsic facts are 
available.  
In light of this initial evidence, I then sought to test the source of the inherence bias. 
Specifically, I hypothesized that naïve participants’ inherent explanations of scientific 
phenomena are rooted in heuristic cognitive processes. I tested this hypothesis by examining 
whether the inherence bias exhibits several signatures of heuristic thought. 
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First, I examined the influence of salience on the inherence bias. If extrinsic facts are less 
likely to be used in generating explanations of scientific phenomena because they are less salient, 
then increasing the salience of extrinsic facts should increase their use (Study 3).  
Next, I examined the time course of participants’ decisions about what type of fact (i.e., 
inherent or extrinsic) was more likely to explain a phenomenon. Heuristics are comparatively 
fast, automatic, and intuitive; thus, if inherent explanations stem from a heuristic process, then 
participants who deliberate longer should be less likely to provide inherent explanations (Studies 
4 and 5).  
The final signature I examined was how the inherence bias in explanation changes over 
the course of development. Younger children have fewer cognitive resources and rely on 
heuristic processes more than older children (Stanovich & West, 2000). Consequently, I 
predicted that, if extrinsic explanations are generated less often because they are more 
cognitively complex, then older children ought to produce extrinsic explanations more often than 
younger children (Studies 6 and 7).  
Finally, having provided converging evidence of an inherence bias from 7 studies with 
naïve participants, I examined how understanding this bias would shed light on theory change in 
the history of science by surveying historians of science (Study 8).  
General Methods for Studies 1 - 7 
Methods 
Participants. For Studies 1 – 5 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
A HIT was posted on Mechanical Turk advertising payment for participation in an academic 
survey. People who chose to participate were then directed from Mechanical Turk to a page that 
confirmed they could participate in the study. People who had previously participated in similar 
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studies were blocked from participation using the software Turkgate. Participants were then 
directed to an informed consent form and then finally to the instructions for a given study.  For 
Studies 1 – 6 participants’ responses were collected using Qualtrics survey software.  
In Studies 6 and 7, children ages 6 – 9 were recruited in a Midwestern college town to 
participate in a study about concepts and categories. Their responses were collected using pen 
and paper questionnaires filled out by an experimenter.  
Attention and memory checks. Several measures were taken to confirm that participants 
(both adults and children) were paying attention while they participated in the study. One of 
these measures checked participants’ attention by asking them to select certain responses 
throughout the course of an experiment (e.g., “Select ‘Agree’ to confirm that you are paying 
attention”). At the end of each study, participants were also asked to report honestly if they took 
the study seriously and paid attention, making it clear that there would be no negative 
consequences if they said they did not. Participants who missed any of the attention checks or 
who indicated they were not paying attention were excluded from analyses. In our studies with 
children, we confirmed that they understood the story they were read by having them repeat 
central details of the story back to the experimenter. 
Materials. For all studies with naïve participants, vignettes about scientific phenomena 
were developed to be both age- and skill-appropriate; I designed the materials so that participants 
could generate explanations for scientific phenomena even in the absence of having detailed 
knowledge about how focal entities in the pattern. Participants – both adults and children – had 
little trouble coming up with explanations for patterns they just learned about.  
Coding. Participants responses were coded for inherence and extrinsicness in studies 
where participants provided open-ended responses (all studies except Study 4). Across studies 
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with adult participants, inter-rater agreement between two-coders ranged from 86% to 91% for 
inherence and 89% to 92% for extrinsicness, suggesting that coders could reliably categorize an 
explanation as inherent or extrinsic. For Studies 6 and 7, a hypothesis-blind researcher coded 
children’s responses for inherence and extrinsicness. A second coder then recoded one third of 
responses, agreeing on 95% of inherence codes and 95% of extrinsicness codes. 
Analytic Strategy 
Data analysis. Rather than performing null-hypothesis significance testing, I used 
Bayesian data analysis. Specifically, I computed Bayesian Credible Intervals (CIs) (Gelman et 
al., 2014) rather than Confidence Intervals. Additionally, I report Bayes factors (e.g., Dienes, 
2014; Wagenmakers, 2007), which are computed using the Savage-Dickey method (Rouder et 
al., 2009). The motivation for using Bayesian data analysis is that it allows the researcher to 
directly infer the probability of a hypothesis given the data (i.e., P(H|D)) rather than having to 
test whether the null hypothesis can be rejected to (indirectly) determine whether the proposed 
hypothesis holds. The probability of the hypothesis given the data is computed via the likelihood 
P(D|H), the prior P(H), and the probability of the data P(D). The likelihood is the probability of 
the data given the hypothesis and the prior is initial information about the hypothesis.  
Bayesian estimation. I performed Bayesian estimation using the probabilistic 
programming language Stan (Gelman et al., 2014), which simulates the posterior using a 
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo method (Duane, Kennedy, Pendleton, & Roweth, 1987; Neal, 2011) 
and its extension, the No-U-Turn Sampler (NUTS) (Hoffman and Gelman, 2014). These 
methods use simulation techniques to take random draws from the posterior distribution to 
estimate the most credible values for a parameter θ. As I noted above, this technique yields 
Credible Intervals rather than Confidence Intervals. Credible Intervals are kernel density plots of 
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the most credible values for a parameter θ given the prior probability of θ and the probability of 
the data given θ. Values closer to the mean of the Credible Interval are more credible than values 
at the tails of this interval (note that this is not the meaning of a Confidence Interval). In studies 
in which I performed Bayesian estimation (i.e., Studies 3 – 8), error bars and shaded regions 
represent 50% Credible Intervals (as recommended by Gelman, 2016) and plots display the 
marginal density of the predictor variable on the x-axis (known as a “rug”). For these studies, I 
also report 95% Credible Intervals in the text.4 
Estimation diagnostics. When performing Bayesian estimation is important to take 
several precautions to ensure that the parameter estimates are stable. For all models reported 
henceforth, I performed diagnostics checks as recommended by Gelman and colleagues (2014).5  
Bayes factors. Throughout the paper, I also report Bayesian hypothesis tests by 
computing Bayes Factors. Bayes Factors are the likelihood of the data under the alternative 
hypothesis divided by the likelihood of the data under the null hypothesis. Larger Bayes Factors 
indicate that the data are more likely under the alternative hypothesis than the null hypothesis, as 
those hypotheses are specified.6 For example, a Bayes Factor of 3 indicates that the data are three 
times more likely under the alternative hypothesis than they are under the null hypothesis. 
																																								 																				
4 Credible Intervals that span zero can still permit the inference that there is credible effect. This is because Credible 
Intervals still allow one to infer that the most credible value is at the center of the probability distribution. Of course, 
when these Intervals are incredibly wide it would be unwise to assume that specific values are particularly credible 
even if, by comparison, they are the most credible in the distribution.  
 
5 First, I confirmed that the steps in a chain were not autocorrelated after warm-up by examining the number of 
“Effective Steps” taken by the workers exploring the posterior distribution – larger number of effective steps ( > 
100) indicate that the subsequent step a worker takes is uncorrelated with the previous steps the worker had taken. 
When steps are highly correlated, workers will not explore the entire posterior distribution, biasing the parameter 
estimates of a model. Second, I confirmed that the chains exploring a posterior converged on similar parameter 
estimates (as indicated by the value r̂) – this is to say, “workers” exploring the posterior distribution settled on 
similar parameter estimates. Third, I confirmed there were no or minimal numbers of divergent steps after warm up 
because large numbers of divergent steps can also lead to unstable parameter estimates. Finally, I confirmed that the 
posterior of the estimated data resembled the distribution of the original data. 
6 As a rule of thumb, Bayes Factors larger than 3 are considered “some” evidence for the alternative hypothesis. 
 17 
Because Bayes Factors can be strongly influenced by selection of priors, I performed prior 
robustness checks to confirm my conclusions were not materially affected by my prior selection.  
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Chapter 2: Is there is an inherence bias in scientific explanation? 
Prior work suggests that people over-rely on inherent facts when they explain everyday 
patterns in the world (Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2015; Tworek & 
Cimpian, 2016). We also see hints of the influence of intuitive biases on naïve adults and 
practicing scientists’ explanations of novel scientific phenomena (Driver et al., 2005; Dunbar, 
1997). On the basis of these results, I predicted that a heuristic-based inherence bias would 
emerge even in the context of scientific explanation. I tested this prediction by examining how 
naïve participants—that is, people who best mirror the epistemic position of early scientists 
unfamiliar with the detailed interactions of the entities in the pattern they hope to explain—
explain fictitious scientific phenomena (Study 1) and unfamiliar phenomena culled from the 
history of science (Study 2).  
Study 1: Naive participants’ explanations of scientific phenomena 
In Study 1, I investigated whether people’s explanations of fictitious scientific 
phenomena in chemistry, biology, and physics overweigh inherent facts.  
Method 
Participants. Participants in Study 1 were 288 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who 
were paid $0.50 for participating in the study. 
Materials and Procedure. In Study 1, participants were told that they would read about 
a series of scientific discoveries and that their task was to come up with the most plausible 
explanation for why these events occurred. Participants read three vignettes describing fictitious 
scientific phenomena from one of three disciplines: chemistry, biology, or physics. The three 
vignettes were selected randomly from a larger pool of six vignettes constructed for each domain 
(see Table A of the Supplementary Materials for additional examples). After reading each 
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vignette, participants were asked to explain why the event occurred (“Explain why this 
happened. Please do your best”) by typing an explanation into a text box.  
Below is a sample vignette:  
Chemists in a lab high in the Colorado Rockies were investigating the possibility of 
storing hydrogen atoms in lithium nitride crystals. In a strange turn of events, these 
chemists found that when they attempted to store the hydrogen atoms in the lithium 
nitrides crystalline structures, it led to a result that completely defied their expectations. 
Instead of the lithium nitride structure storing 15% of hydrogen atoms, the crystalline 
structures stored 2% of hydrogen atoms. This is despite the fact that these scientists had 
more than 40 years of experience between them working with lithium nitride. 
 
The vignettes were designed to provide a conservative test of my hypothesis: First, the vignettes 
mentioned a plausible extrinsic factor that participants could use in their explanations. This 
feature of the vignettes ensures that, if participants explain a pattern inherently, it is not for lack 
of extrinsic explanation options. Second, the scientists’ observations were described as 
anomalies (e.g., the result “completely defied their expectations”). This, again, makes it more 
difficult for participants to generate an inherent explanation: If an object is behaving 
anomalously it is unlikely that its behavior would be due to a reliable (inherent) property of the 
object—recall that inherent properties are properties of the object in and of itself. (see the 
Supplementary Materials for a study validating this assumption).      
 Within each discipline, the six vignettes were constructed using three consistent 
templates (3 templates × 2 tokens = 6 vignettes per domain; see Table 1 below) that varied along 
a number of dimensions (e.g., whether the extrinsic fact—namely, location—was mentioned 
before or after the phenomenon to be explained). 
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Table 1 
The vignette templates used in Study 1.  
Template 1 
[Disciplinists] in [location] were investigating [hypothesis 
or phenomenon]. In a strange turn of events, these 
[disciplinists] found that when they attempted [perform 
action], it led to a result that completely defied their 
expectations. Instead of [expected outcome], [unexpected 
outcome]. This is despite the fact that these scientists had 
more than 40 years of experience between them 
[performing action]. 
Template 2 
A group of experienced [disciplinists] were looking to 
[perform action]. These [disciplinists] were working in 
[location]. Typically, [performing action] leads to [expected 
outcome]. Surprisingly, when these [disciplinists] 
[performed action] an [unexpected outcome] occurred. 
Template 3 
[Disciplinists] have discovered something astonishing about 
[chemical, biological, or physical phenomena], which they 
observed/experimented with in [location]. [Disciplinists] 
observed [chemical, biological, or physical phenomena]. 
This [event] puzzled chemists because they initially 
theorized that [objects in event] would behave differently. 
 
 After completing this task, participants answered a series of demographic questions about 
their college education, religion, and gender.   
Results and Discussion 
My primary interest was in the descriptive question of whether people’s explanations of 
scientific observations would exhibit an inherence bias. To test this hypothesis, participants’ 
explanations were coded for inherence and extrinsicness. For example, an explanation that was 
inherent but not extrinsic, would receive a code of 1 for inherence and 0 for extrinsicness. These 
categories were not mutually exclusive: Participants could provide more than one type of 
explanation, in which case their response would receive a code of 1 for inherence and 1 for 
extrinsicness. I then averaged participants’ explanations across vignettes into composite scores 
representing the proportion of explanations that were inherent and the proportion of explanations 
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that were extrinsic.  
I was interested in examining the presence of an inherence bias in scientific explanation. 
To examine this prediction, I compared the proportion of inherent explanations to the proportion 
of extrinsic explanations (see Figure 4). As I predicted, a Bayesian paired “t test” revealed that 
participants explained scientific observations more inherently (M = .56, SD = .29, SE = .02) than 
extrinsically (M = .41, SD = .29, SE = .02), BF = 5,892, Error = 5.88e -9. I observed this bias in 
chemistry (Inherent: M = .53, SD = .32; Extrinsic: M = .43, SD = .32), biology (Inherent: M = 
.62, SD = .28; Extrinsic: M = .35, SD = .26), and physics (Inherent: M = .54, SD = .31; Extrinsic: 
M = .45, SD = .29), all BFs > 3. Further, participants explained more inherently than we would 
expect by chance alone, BF = 45.34, Error = 9.775e -7. Of the 18 vignettes, 13 vignettes 
exhibited a bias in the predicted direction (i.e., towards inherence), BF > 3. Of the 284 
participants, 169 participants’ explanation averages exhibited a bias in the predicted direction, 
BF > 3.  
 
Figure 3. The mean proportion of inherent and extrinsic explanations for scientific observations 
in Study 1. Error bars represent ±1 standard error 
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In summary, the results of Study 1 are consistent with the prediction that naïve 
participants’ scientific explanations exhibit an inherence bias. People’s explanations of scientific 
phenomena in chemistry, biology, and physics relied on inherent facts more than extrinsic facts, 
even though a plausible extrinsic fact was available to be used in an explanation.  
Study 2: Naive participants’ explanations of phenomena from the history of science 
 Although describing fictitious scientific phenomena allowed me to exercise maximum 
control over the content of the stimuli, the vignettes used in Study 1 were relatively artificial. 
Thus, in Study 2 I asked participants to explain real scientific observations that played a role in 
the history of science. For example, the observation that pollen moved in solvents was thought to 
show that the pollen was still alive, that is, until it was revealed that submicroscopic particles 
were pushing the pollen around. I predict that naïve participants will gravitate toward inherent 
explanations much as Brown did when he first peered through his microscope.   
Method 
Participants. Participants in Study 2 were 252 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who 
were paid $0.25 for participating in the study. 
Materials and Procedure. The procedure of Study 2 was similar to that of Study 1. 
However, in Study 2, participants explained two scientific observations from one of three 
disciplines: chemistry, biology, or physics. Only six vignettes were constructed for this study 
(two per discipline; see Supplementary Materials Table A for additional examples). For example, 
participants read the following vignette taken from the history of chemistry in which Lavoisier 
was investigating Aristotle’s hypothesis about how water when heated begins to transmute into 
soil:  
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A chemist conducted the following experiment: They boiled distilled water in a sealed 
vessel for 100 days and found that solid sediment appeared at the bottom of the vessel. 
This result was quite striking to the chemist. 
 
As in Study 1, after reading each vignette participants were asked to do their best to explain why 
the event occurred.  
Results and Discussion 
I again coded participants’ responses for inherence and extrinsicness. Just as in Study 1, 
each response was coded on each of these dimensions (0 = dimension absent, 1 = present). I then 
averaged participants’ explanations across vignettes into composite scores representing the 
proportion of explanations that were inherent and the proportion of explanations that were 
extrinsic.  
As in Study 1, I performed a Bayesian paired t test which revealed that participants 
explained observations culled from the history of science more inherently (M =.64, SD = .36, SE 
= .02) than extrinsically (M = .38, SD = .37, SE = .02), BF = 1.043e +6, Error = 3.964e -12. I 
observed similar effects in chemistry (Inherent: M = .71, SD = .34; Extrinsic: M = .32, SD = .36), 
biology (Inherent: M = .62, SD = .39; Extrinsic: M = .38, SD = .38), and physics (Inherent: M = 
.59, SD = .36; Extrinsic: M = .44, SD = .38), all BFs > 3. Also, participants explained more 
inherently than we would expect by chance alone, BF = 5.705e +6, Error = 2.331e -13 (see 
Figure 4). Of the six vignettes, four exhibited a bias in the predicted direction (i.e., towards 
inherence), BF < 3. Of 254 participants, 210 participants’ explanation averages exhibited a bias 
in the predicted direction, BF > 3. 
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Figure 4. The mean proportion of inherent and extrinsic explanations for scientific observations 
culled from the history of science in Study 2. Error bars represent ±1 standard error 
 
In summary, the results of Study 2 support my hypothesis that naïve participants’ 
explanations of scientific observations culled from the history of science exhibit an inherence 
bias. This suggests that the inherence bias revealed in Study 1 can generalize real episodes from 
the history of science.   
Interim Summary 
The data from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that when people first confront and attempt to 
explain a novel scientific phenomenon, they do so more inherently than extrinsically. I observed 
this inherence bias in the domains of chemistry, biology, and physics. This finding, of course, 
does not entail that in every scenario what is salient is inherent nor that people will always 
explain more inherently than extrinsically. Rather, these results suggest that when people first 
begin to explain a complex novel observation that requires reliance on difficult-to-access 
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Inherent Extrinsic
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 E
xp
la
na
tio
ns
 25 
information (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), they do so more inherently than extrinsically. This 
finding supports the hypothesis that a domain-general inherence heuristic (Cimpian & Salomon, 
2014) influences scientific explanation. This is striking in and of itself given that, as I have 
noted, scientific explanation is a paradigmatic example of a deliberative enterprise.  
While the data thus far are consistent with the influence of an inherence heuristic on 
scientific explanation, I more directly tested the heuristic source of participants’ inherence bias 
by examining whether it exhibits key signatures of heuristic thinking.  
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Chapter 3: Is the inherence bias in scientific explanation rooted in heuristic thinking? 
Study 3: The influence of salience on inherent explanations 
Prior research suggests that the inherence bias in everyday explanation is due to the fact 
that when people explain an observation, the main entities of the phenomenon to be explained 
(e.g., orange juice) become active in working memory. Because active memories are often 
assumed to be a cue for the problem at hand (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), 
inherent facts will dominate what is salient when generating an explanation. If inherent facts are 
more salient when participants first attempt to explain a pattern and this leads to an inherence 
bias then increasing the salience of extrinsic facts should lead to a decrease in the proportion of 
inherent explanations of a pattern.  
Methods 
Participants. Participants in Study 3 were 486 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who 
were paid $0.50 for their participation.  
Materials and Procedures. In Study 3, participants read eight vignettes describing 
scientific observations from one of three disciplines: chemistry, biology, or physics. These 
vignettes were selected randomly from a larger pool of 24 (18 from Study 1 + 6 from Study 2).  
After each vignette, participants were asked to complete the following sentence to the 
best of their ability: “Something about the ______ explains the outcome of the experiment.” 
Participants were assigned to either the Forced-Choice condition or the Production condition 
(between subjects). In the Forced-Choice condition, participants were instructed to choose 
between two words representing an inherent and an extrinsic explanation. For example, if 
participants read about the chemist boiling water in a vessel, they were provided with the options 
“Water” and “Vessel” representing inherent and extrinsic explanations, respectively. In the 
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Production condition, participants were asked to type in a word or words that best completed the 
sentence. For example, participants might write “water” or “vessel.” Just as in Studies 1 and 2, 
the words participants produced were coded as being an inherent explanation or an extrinsic 
explanation. In the rare instance that a participant wrote something indicating both an inherent 
and extrinsic explanation, their response was coded as extrinsic (that is, in the direction contrary 
to my hypothesis).  
I predicted that—consistent with influence of an inherence heuristic on scientific 
explanation—making extrinsic facts more salient would lead to fewer inherent explanations. 
That is, I predicted that participants assigned to the Forced-Choice condition, the condition in 
which the extrinsic fact is explicitly stated as a possible explanation, would provide more 
extrinsic explanations than those assigned to the Production condition. However, because 
inherent explanations are still less relationally complex than extrinsic explanations (Cimpian & 
Salmon, 2014), I also predicted that there would be an inherence bias in participants’ 
explanations regardless of condition. This is because, as I noted, even if an extrinsic factor is 
salient to participants, they still need to determine how it is that this factor interacts with the 
entities in the pattern to explain the observation—this increases relational complexity. Inherent 
explanations, in contrast, require no such working out because no additional explanatory 
variables are added to the equation.    
Results and Discussion 
 In Study 3 I fit a Bayesian logistic mixed-effects model predicting inherent explanation 
responses (1 = Inherent, 0 = Extrinsic), on the basis of a participant’s condition assignment 
(Production Condition = 1, Forced-Choice Condition = 0). I fit a model estimating the effect of 
condition on inherent explanations, and included random intercepts for subject and vignette 
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structure. 
 
Figure 5. The marginal likelihood of participants in the Forced Choice and Production conditions 
providing inherent explanations in Study 3. Error bars represent 50% Credible Intervals. 
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Table 2 
Bayesian logistic mixed-effects regression predicting proportion of inherent explanations on the 
basis of condition in Study 3. 
Population-Level 
Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Intercept .68 .69 4,107 −.70 2.18 1 
Condition .54 .11 11,563 .31 .76 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject) .88 .07 6,115 .76 1.01 1 
SD(Vignette) .66 .13 5,188 .46 .95 1 
Note. Reference group is the Forced-Choice Condition. Population-Level effects are also known 
as “Fixed-Effects” and Group-Level Effects are also known as “Random Effects” (see Gelman et 
al., 2014).    
 
I predicted that the Production condition would lead to more inherent explanations than 
the Forced-Choice condition because in the Production condition, extrinsic explanations are not 
as salient. Consistent with this hypothesis, I observed a credible difference between participants’ 
performance in the Forced-Choice and Production conditions. Participants in the Production 
condition were more likely than participants in the Forced-Choice condition to provide an 
inherent (vs. extrinsic) explanation, β = 0.54, 95% CI [.32 to .76]. Further, as I predicted, in both 
conditions participants still exhibited an inherence bias, suggesting that salience alone cannot 
account for the inherence bias in explanatory reasoning—even when an extrinsic fact is 
accessible, a participant still must work out how it is that the environment and the entity in the 
pattern interact to account for the observation, BF > 3. Of the 24 vignettes, 23 vignettes exhibited 
a bias in the predicted direction (i.e., towards inherence), BF > 3. Of 485 participants, 408 
participants’ explanation averages exhibited a bias in the predicted direction, BF > 3. 
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In sum, Study 3 provides two important pieces of evidence for the influence of an 
inherence heuristic on scientific explanation. First, using two different tasks than those used in 
Studies 1 and 2, I found that participants still explained scientific phenomena more inherently 
than extrinsically. This confirms that our prior results were not due to idiosyncrasies of the task 
participants performed in Studies 1 and 2. Second, and consistent with the influence of a domain-
general inherence heuristic on scientific explanation, I found that manipulating the salience of 
extrinsic facts lowered participants’ tendency to endorse inherent explanations. 
Study 4: The influence of deliberation time on inherent explanations 
It is well known that heuristic thinking tends to be relatively automatic and effortless 
rather than deliberative and effortful (Stanovich & West, 2000). In Study 4, I tested whether the 
inherence bias in scientific explanation would be weakened among those participants who 
reflected for a longer amount of time on the explanandum. According to the inherence heuristic 
account, what comes to mind first when participants explain an observation are inherent facts 
about the entities in that observation rather than extrinsic facts about them. Thus, I predicted that 
participants who deliberate longer about the phenomenon to be explained should explain this 
phenomenon less inherently because they are more likely to retrieve (and thus use) extrinsic 
facts. This prediction is also consistent with prior findings that relationally complex reasoning—
of the sort often involved in extrinsic explanations—requires longer deliberation times (Waltz et 
al., 2000). 
Methods 
Participants. Participants in Study 4 were 125 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who 
were paid $0.60 for participating in the study. An additional six participants were tested but 
excluded because they indicated that they didn’t pay attention during the study.  
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Materials and Procedures. Participants read 8 vignettes from chemistry, biology, and 
physics, for a total of 24 vignettes in a within-subjects design. The vignettes used in Study 4 
were identical to the vignettes used in Study 3 and the design of Study 4 was otherwise identical 
to the Forced-Choice condition of Study 3. Participants simply chose between an inherent and 
extrinsic explanation of a scientific observation. I recorded participants’ response times using 
Qualtrics survey software to test the predicted relationship between the inherence bias in 
explanation and deliberation time. 
Results and Discussion 
 As in Study 3, I fit a Bayesian logistic mixed effects model predicting inherent 
explanation choices (1 = Inherent, 0 = Extrinsic) based on the amount of time (log-transformed, 
Kliegl et al., 2010) participants took to make their choice. Trials that were extremely fast (less 
than 5 seconds to read and choose an explanation) or extremely slow (greater than 100 seconds) 
were removed before analyzing the data leading to the exclusion of 6.2% of trials. The model 
included random intercepts and random slopes (for reaction time) over subject and vignette, 
allowing the relationship between time and explanation choices to vary at the level of subject and 
vignette.  
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Figure 6. The marginal likelihood of participants making inherent explanations across response 
time in Study 4. Shaded region represents 50% Credible Intervals.  
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Table 3 
Bayesian logistic mixed-effects regression predicting proportion of inherent explanations on the 
basis of decision time in Study 4.  
Population-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Intercept 1.39 .46 7,737 .5 2.30 1 
Time −.26 .12 10,581 −.50 −.03 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject) 2.64 .51 4,331 1.65 3.69 1 
SD(Time) .57 .16 3,151 .27 .89 1 𝑟(Subject, Time) −.97 .03 2,293 −1.00 −.90 1 
SD(Vignette) 1.04 .38 4,018 .49 1.93 1 
SD(Time) .16 .11 2,484 .01 .42 1 𝑟(Vignette, Time) −.61 .45 5,171 −.99 .72 1 
 
As predicted, I found that participants’ explanation choices were predicted by how long 
they spent deliberating about their choice – participants that reflected on the explanandum tended 
to choose the inherent explanation less often than participants who made their decisions quickly, 
β = -0.26, 95% CI [-.50 to -.03]. Here again I observed an inherence bias in explanation: Of the 
24 vignettes participants were tasked with explaining, 19 vignettes exhibited a bias in the 
predicted direction (i.e., towards inherence). Of 125 participants, 86 participants’ explanation 
averages exhibited a bias in the predicted direction, all BFs > 3. This finding provides further 
support for the claim that people’s tendency to explain scientific phenomena inherently is rooted 
in heuristic processing; longer decision-times were negatively correlated with inherent 
explanation choices.  
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Studies 3 and 4 thus provide additional evidence that the inherence bias in scientific 
explanation that I observed in Studies 1 and 2 is rooted in a domain-general inherence heuristic. 
Study 5: The influence of prompting deeper search on inherent explanations 
Studies 1 – 4 have provided evidence for an inherence bias in scientific explanation that 
exhibits the signatures of heuristic thought. In Study 5, I sought to quasi-experimentally test the 
claim that requiring participants to reflect longer by having them produce additional explanations 
would reduce the subsequent proportion of inherent explanations.  
 
Methods 
Participants. Participants in Study 5 were 98 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who 
were paid $0.60 for participating in the study. An additional two participants were tested but 
excluded because they indicated that they were not paying attention during the study.  
Materials and Procedures. Participants were presented with six vignettes (developed on 
the basis of the vignettes used in Study 1) and asked to perform a fill in the blank task modeled 
on the Production condition from Study 3. In Study 5, however, participants were asked to fill in 
the blank in the sentence “Something about _____ explains the observation”, which was 
presented three times on the same page after each of 6 vignettes for a total of 18 explanations. 
Thus, participants were required to reflect further on the observation because they were required 
to produce multiple distinct explanations for the same observation. The design of Study 5 was 
otherwise identical to the Production condition of Study 3.  
Results  
I predicted that participants would be more likely to provide inherent explanations 
initially but this tendency would decrease as they provided additional explanations of the same 
observation. To test this prediction, I fit a Bayesian logistic mixed-effects model predicting the 
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production of an inherent explanation (1 = Inherent, 0 = Extrinsic) based on the order in which 
the explanation was produced. This model included random intercepts for subject and vignette. 
The results are summarized below in Figure 12 and Table 13.  
 
Figure 7. The mean proportion of inherent explanations for novel scientific observations by the 
order in which the explanations were produced in Study 5. Error bars represent 50% Credible 
Intervals.  
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Table 4 
Bayesian logistic mixed-effects regression predicting proportion of inherent explanations on the 
basis of the order in which they were produced in Study 5. 
Population-Level 
Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Intercept 1.06 .25 4,787 .56 1.55 1 
Second Explanation −.33 .15 16,000 −.61 −.05 1 
Third Explanation −.74 .15 16,000 −1.03 −.45 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject) .89 .11 5,884 .7 1.11 1 
SD(Vignette) .44 .24 4,837 .17 1.05 1 
Note: The reference group is the First Explanation group.   
Consistent with the results of Study 4, I found that participants’ first explanations of an 
observation tended to be more inherent than extrinsic, with each subsequent explanation of the 
same observation tending to be less inherent and more extrinsic; as participants were forced to 
reflect more deeply on the observation to be explained, they provided more extrinsic 
explanations.  
The emergence and the development of the inherence bias in scientific explanation 
Intuitive biases affect children’s understanding of scientific phenomena inside and 
outside the classroom. Children make a several errors when they reason about the scientific 
world. Moreover, we see reduced inherent fact use as children develop (Cimpian & Steinberg, 
2014), consistent with the relational shift in thinking across development (e.g., Doumas et al., 
2008) and decreased intuitive thinking across childhood. In line with this prior work, I sought to 
further test the heuristic roots of the inherence bias in scientific explanations by examining how 
young children between ages 6 and 9 explain scientific observations. These results would 
 37 
provide further evidence for the proposed heuristic source of the bias toward inherence in 
scientific explanation. 
Study 6: Inherent explanations across development 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty-nine children (ages 6 – 9; 58.3% Female; MAge = 7.52 years old) 
were recruited in a Midwestern college town to participate on a study in which they explained 
why a series of scientific events occurred.  
Materials and Procedures. In Study 6, children were read four stories about scientific 
phenomena (two from biology, one from chemistry, and one from physics). I adapted the 
scientific vignettes from Study 1 to be age-appropriate and further altered these vignettes with 
the aim of very strongly emphasizing the relevance of the extrinsic feature to the observed 
pattern. My hope was that this would increase the variance in children’s responses. As such, I 
was not interested in overall inherent (vs. extrinsic) responding given that prior work has already 
shown that children explain more inherently than extrinsically (Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). For 
example, children were read with the following vignette (see Table B of the Supplementary 
Materials for additional examples): 
There is a plant called a Flurp Plant that lives high on a volcano in Africa. The volcano 
that this plant lives on is really tall, way taller than most volcanos! Now, you know how 
most plants need lots of air for them to grow? Well, this kind of plant barely needs any 
air at all even though it’s like other plants in every other way. The Flurp Plant can live for 
a long time without air.  
 
Don’t you think that’s cool!? What’s really amazing is that the Flurp Plant is like other 
plants in every other way, so it’s really strange that it does not need air.  
 
After each vignette, children were asked to explain why the observation occurred.  
If you had to make a guess, why do you think that is? Why doesn’t the Flurp plant need 
air? 
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After children provided an explanation for the observation, I then asked them to describe to the 
experimenter as much as they could remember about the story. This was to confirm children 
were paying attention and could recall central details about each vignette. Children correctly 
recalled the central details of the vignettes over 95% of the time.  
My primary aim was to test the hypothesized influence of a heuristic process on scientific 
explanation by examining whether the proportion of inherent explanations decreases with age 
and the proportion of extrinsic explanations increases with age. 
Results and Discussion 
 Children’s responses were coded for inherence and extrinsicness just as in Studies 1 and 
2. I then performed Bayesian logistic mixed-effects modeling, predicting the production of an 
inherent (or extrinsic) explanation based on a child’s age. This model also included random 
intercepts for subject and vignette.  
  
 39 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The marginal likelihood of children of different ages producing inherent explanations 
in Study 6. Shaded region represents 50% Credible Intervals. 
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Table 5 
Bayesian logistic mixed-effects regression predicting proportion of inherent explanations on the 
basis of age in Study 6. 
Population-Level 
Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Intercept 3.68 1.88 5,434 .02 7.46 1 
Age −.53 .24 16,000 −1.02 −.07 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject) .66 .40 4,058 .04 1.52 1 
SD(Vignette) .64 .78 2,552 .02 2.82 1 
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Figure 9. The marginal likelihood of the predicted effect of age on extrinsic explanations in 
Study 6. Shaded region represents 50% Credible Intervals. 
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Table 6 
Bayesian logistic mixed-effects regression predicting proportion of extrinsic explanations on the 
basis of age in Study 6. 
Population-Level 
Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Intercept -5.07 1.90 16,000 −9.00 −1.48 1 
Age .75 .25 16,000 .28 1.27 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject) .61 .38 4,925 .03 1.47 1 
SD(Vignette) .46 .57 4,123 .01 2.00 1 
 
As predicted, I found that older children (as compared to younger children) were less 
likely to explain a pattern inherently (β = -0.53, 95% CI [-1.0 to -.08] and more likely to explain 
a pattern extrinsically, β = 0.75, 95% CI [0.29 to 1.26] (see Figures 8 and 9). These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that children with more limited cognitive resources – that is, 
younger children – tend to explain scientific phenomena more inherently than extrinsically. In 
Study 7, I replicated the results of Study 6.   
Study 7: Replicating the results of Study 6 
In Study 7, I aimed to replicate the results of Study 6 with a larger sample size.  
Methods 
Participants. Eighty-two children (ages 6 – 9; 51.2% Female; MAge = 7.95 years old) 
were recruited in a Midwestern college town to participate in a study in which they learned about 
and explained a series of scientific phenomena.  
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Materials and Procedures. The materials used and the procedures followed were 
identical to those of Study 6.7 I predicted that I would replicate the results of Study 6 – older 
children would explain less inherently and more extrinsically than younger children. If extrinsic 
facts are harder to use to produce an explanation because they are more complex, then children 
with larger working-memory capacities should have less trouble using these facts in their 
explanations than children with more limited working-memory capacities.  
Results 
I observed comparable results to those of Study 6: Older children (as compared to 
younger children) again explained more extrinsically (β = 0.54, 95% CI [0.20 to 0.91] and less 
inherently, β = -0.37, 95% CI [-0.71 to -0.06] (see Figures 9 and 10; Tables 7 and 8 below).  
 
																																								 																				
7 Study 7 included an additional measure aimed at measuring a child’s working-memory capacity – the Backwards 
Digit Span Task. However, there were problems in the administration of the task which led us fail to detect the well-
validated finding that older children have larger spans than younger children (see Wechsler, 2003, p. 267). There 
were no differences in the spans 6 (M = 3.4, SD = .75), 7 (M = 3.36, SD = .49), 8 (M = 3.42, SD = .81), or 9-year-old 
children (M = 3.79, SD = .85). In light of these issues, I have omitted discussion of this measure.  
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Figure 10. The marginal likelihood of children of different ages producing inherent explanations 
in Study 7. Shaded region represents 50% Credible Intervals. 
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Table 7 
Bayesian logistic mixed-effects regression predicting proportion of inherent explanations on the 
basis of age in Study 7. 
Population-Level 
Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Intercept 2.41 1.58 6,648 −.69 5.60 1 
Age −.37 .16 11,913 −.69 −.06 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject) 1.00 .26 4,519 .49 1.53 1 
SD(Vignette) 1.47 1.2 4,065 .43 4.86 1 
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Figure 11. The marginal likelihood of children of different ages producing extrinsic explanations 
in Study 7. Shaded region represents 50% Credible Intervals.  
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Table 8 
Bayesian logistic mixed-effects regression predicting proportion of extrinsic explanations on the 
basis of age in Study 7. 
Population-Level 
Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Intercept -2.96 1.61 16,000 −6.19 .12 1 
Age .54 .18 16,000 .20 .91 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject) .99 .30 3,452 .38 1.59 1 
SD(Vignette) 1.2 1.14 2,444 .24 4.34 1 
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Chapter 4: Implications for the History of Science and Study 8 
A systematic investigation suggest that heuristic processes influence the scientific 
explanations of naïve participants. However, one might wonder the extent to which naïve 
scientific explanation diverges from the explanations of practicing scientists. That is, how much 
do naïve participants’ explanatory biases generalize to practicing scientists?  
As discussed earlier, it appears that psychological constraints can even affect how 
practicing scientists conduct science and explain phenomena. For example, Dunbar (1997) found 
that in top research labs, scientists often relied on featural similarity in drawing analogies 
between a source and target rather than abstract, structural similarity (Chen & Khlar, 1999). 
Even the most characteristically deliberative exercises will be constrained by cognitive 
limitations of working-memory and, more generally, basic facts about human psychology.  
Beyond these data, is there evidence that these cognitive constraints can also lead to an inherence 
bias in scientific explanation? A careful inspection of the history of science suggests that 
inherent explanations may be particularly common among the first researchers who have 
attempted to explain a scientific phenomenon—that is, those scientists that most clearly mirror 
the position of our naïve participants. For example, consider the progression of theories of 
motion: According to Aristotelian mechanics, an object falls because of the object’s inherent 
downward tendency; the object’s natural place is on the ground, and that is a property of the 
object itself. Impetus theorists (e.g., Buridan) continued to attribute movement to a certain force 
within the moving object (i.e., impetus) but also began to acknowledge the importance of other 
forces extrinsic to the object itself. Later, Newton explained motion by primarily invoking an 
external gravitational force, an extrinsic explanation.  
In the science education literature, researchers have also noted the similarity between the 
biases of naïve participants and working scientists. Driver and colleagues (2005) note: 
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Throughout history the same everyday experiences that led earlier scientists like Aristotle 
and Buridan to develop theories of motion have a lot in common with gut and lay 
dynamics. 
 
Finally, some evidence for the link between naïve participants’ explanations and working 
scientists’ explanations comes from the results of Study 2 – participants’ explanations in Study 2 
often mirrored early scientists’ explanations of these same phenomena. To consider just one 
example, several participants provided quasi-Aristotelian explanation of why sediment emerged 
in distilled boiling water. One participant wrote,  
“Something in the water has broken down and the soil is no longer suspended in the 
water so it fell to the bottom.” 
 
In contrast, another participant explained the same phenomenon extrinsically in a manner 
extremely similar to that of Lavoisier, who famously refuted Aristotle’s original hypothesis by 
carefully measuring the weight of the water and vessel before and after he conducted the study: 
“I believe that the vessel decomposed with in the 100 days and caused a solid sediment to 
form.” 
 
Aristotle hypothesized that water can be transmuted into soil. In contrast, Lavoisier argued, 
based on a systematic investigation in which he weighed both the beaker and the water prior to 
performing the study, that the sediment came from the beaker rather than the water. Although 
this is just one example, several participants’ explanations for a variety of historical scientific 
observations often mirrored explanations that appear throughout the history of science.  
Based on empirical findings, as well as a careful inspection of the historical record, I 
hypothesized that the pioneers of a scientific field—those who cannot benefit from the 
accumulated insights of past generations—may be particularly likely to use the seeds supplied by 
their explanatory intuitions to formulate systematic hypotheses about an observation. In turn, if 
these explanatory intuitions are often inherent, as I have found in naïve participants, then early 
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theoretical forays into a domain may also tend to be skewed toward inherence. This is not to say 
that early scientific theories are somehow less thoughtful or well-reasoned than later ones. 
Rather, I suggest that one’s basic explanatory intuitions may end up exerting a more noticeable 
influence on one’s scientific thinking if these intuitions are not reined in by exposure to the 
evidence accumulated by previous generations of practitioners. My claim should not be 
construed as deterministic: Obviously, science is not a march toward ever-more-extrinsic 
explanations. However, if my hypothesis is correct, I should nevertheless see a greater 
preponderance of early inherence-based explanations than one might expect otherwise, along 
with a reliable tendency for later explanations of those same phenomena to correct for some of 
the early inherence bias.  
 Rather than testing this hypothesis by examining only a few examples from the history of 
science, I recruited historians from history and philosophy of science departments in the US and 
UK.  
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 25 experts in the history and philosophy of science 
recruited from major research universities with history and philosophy of science departments in 
the US and UK. 
Materials and Procedure. In Study 8, participants were asked to list with the most 
important explanatory transitions in the history of science. I explained to participants that 
explanatory transitions are a situation in which a scientist explained an observation in one way 
(e.g., Aristotelian dynamics explained why an object falls) and a later scientist explained this 
same observation in a different way (e.g., Newtonian mechanics). Of the 25 historians of science 
that participated in the study, 23 provided examples of major scientific transitions (initial and 
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subsequent explanations of the same observation), yielding 81 transitions. (Two of the scientists 
failed to complete the task because they just listed names without reference to any specific 
observation (e.g., Aristotle, Einstein)). Two hypothesis blind coders with graduate-level 
education in the history of science coded historians’ responses for inherence and extrinsicness 
(Overall Explanation Agreement: 82%).8 An additional 24 transitions were provided by 
participants but the coders judged that these responses were either not explanatory transitions 
(e.g., shifts in taxonomy), or they were orthogonal to the inherence-extrinsicness distinction.  
Recall that I predicted that earlier explanations of a phenomenon would tend to be more 
inherent because early scientists’ intuitive explanatory beliefs would be less likely to be reined in 
by the evidence accumulated by previous generations of practitioners. Table 9 below shows the 
pattern of major explanatory transitions from the history of science.  
  
																																								 																				
8 I recruited coders with a background in the history and philosophy of science because some background in history 
was necessary to interpret the often terse responses of professional historians and philosophers of science.  
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Table 9 
Initial and Subsequent Major Explanatory Transitions from the History of Science in Study 8.  
 
Table 10 
Bayesian categorical regression by explanatory transition type (Intercept only model) in Study 8. 
Population-Level 
Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Inherent to Inherent 
(Intercept) -1.53 1.36 2,008 -5.03 .05 1 
Extrinsic to Inherent 
(Intercept) -1.28 .84 3,860 -3.25 -.10 1 
Inherent to Extrinsic 
(Intercept) 1.11 .33 15,000 .50 1.79 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject (Inherent 
to Inherent Intercept)) 1.83 1.41 1,927 .12 5.31 1 
SD(Subject (Extrinsic 
to Inherent Intercept)) .93 .86 3,245 .03 3.09 1 
SD(Subject (Inherent 
to Extrinsic Intercept)) .44 .35 6,392 .02 1.29 1 
Note. Reference group is the explanatory transition “Extrinsic to Inherent.”  
  
  Subsequent 
  Inherent Extrinsic 
Initial 
Inherent 12 46 
Extrinsic 9 14 
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Consistent with my proposal, historians of scientists generated many more examples of 
explanatory transitions in which the early explanation of an observation was inherent and the 
subsequent explanation of this same phenomenon was more extrinsic, β = 1.11 95% CI [0.50 to 
1.79] (Table 9 and 10 above). 
This work reveals an important facet of early scientific explanations that had not yet been 
articulated in prior work on the psychology of the history and philosophy of science (e.g., 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1996; Nersessian, 1992; Wiser & Carey, 1983): Early explanations of major 
scientific explanatory transitions tend to be more inherent and less extrinsic than later 
explanations of the same observation.  
Are practicing scientists really exhibiting an inherence bias? 
Although I have provided evidence that naïve participants exhibit an inherence bias in 
their explanations of scientific phenomena, one might wonder to what extent this claim 
accurately characterizes the behavior and theorizing of practicing scientists. Turning to the case 
of Brown, one an alternative explanation of how Brown began to make sense of the motion of 
the pollen is not that he exhibited an inherence bias rooted in heuristic processes but rather that 
he was working with the only information that he had available. After all, technological 
limitations did not allow Brown to observe the submicroscopic particles that were pushing the 
pollen around. Generalizing from this example, perhaps it also the case that many instances of 
early “inherent” explanations from the history of science are cases in which the practicing 
scientist had no other information at their disposal—there was no extrinsic fact on which they 
could base their explanations.  
First, the results from the studies with naïve participants speaks against this hypothesis. I 
have found that inherent explanations decrease over development (Studies 6 and 7), decrease as 
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people deliberate longer (Studies 4 and 5). These findings are consistent with the presence of a 
heuristic process that is biased towards inherence and inconsistent with the claim that an 
inherence bias follows from exclusive reliance on the data at hand. 
 Second, if Brown and other vitalists, for instance, were solely relying on the data that was 
available to them then we would not expect them to posit unseen vitalist forces to explain the 
motion of the pollen. While they might be able to conclude that “something about the pollen” 
explains its motion because no other information was available, positing vitalistic forces goes 
well beyond the data. Given the similarity in the vitalist explanations of Brown, naïve 
participants, and even young children (Driver et al., 2005), it seems just as likely that their 
explanations were constrained by basic cognitive mechanisms.  
 Third, even if this explanation can account for the case of Brownian motion, many other 
historical examples suggest an inherence bias because plausible extrinsic factors were available. 
For instance, Aristotle and many of his followers thought that water could be transmuted into soil 
based on studies showing that when water was boiled in a sealed vessel, solid sediment would 
begin to emerge at the bottom of the vessel. In this case, the decomposition of the vessel rather 
than properties of the water explained the presence of the solid sediment. Yet, Aristotle and 
many other scientists prior to Lavoisier thought that something about the nature of water—the 
focal entity in the pattern to be explained—explained the emergence of the sediment rather than 
the vessel in which the water was contained. The vessel was entirely accessible as an alternative 
explanation, but it simply was ignored in theorizing. There are many other similar cases in the 
history of science, including early explanations for organisms being well-adapted to their 
environments (the presence of the environment was observable), retrograde motion of the planets 
(the presence of the Sun was observable), spontaneous generation (the presence of flies was 
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observable) and so forth. Thus, looking at the historical record provides evidence for an 
inherence bias which cannot be easily explained by the hypothesis that practicing scientists were 
relying solely on the information at their disposal.  
 In sum, the present empirical work, practicing scientists’ willingness to posit 
unobservables, and the historical record speak against the hypothesis that there was no other 
information available for early scientists to rely on as they constructed their explanations. 
Instead, these results suggest that naïve participants and scientists alike, at least under certain 
circumstances, rely on their intuitions as they begin to make sense of the world. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
People have a drive to explain and understand the world (e.g., Gopnik, 1998; Keil, 2006; 
Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2011; Lombrozo, 2006; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Premack & 
Premack, 1996; Ross, 1977; Weiner, 1985). Yet, explanatory reasoning is an enormously 
complex task. This may be particularly true in the domain of science where minor changes in 
environmental factors could greatly impact the stability of a chemical reaction or the behavior of 
animals. However, rather than being dumbfounded at every turn, people produce explanations 
and do so relatively effortlessly—indeed, our participants knew little about the focal entities in 
the pattern and their interactions with the environment but they nonetheless managed to come up 
with explanations for observations involving these entities. Prior research has suggested that one 
source of people’s explanations are domain-specific intuitive beliefs. The present work suggests 
that in addition to many of these domain-specific biases there is a domain-general inherence bias 
rooted in heuristic processing that systematically influences people’s explanations across 
chemistry, biology, and physics.  
In Studies 1 and 2, I found that naïve participants explained scientific phenomena in 
chemistry, physics, and biology in terms of the inherent facts of the entities in the observation, 
even when a plausible extrinsic explanation was accessible.  
Next, I provided evidence that the inherence bias in scientific explanation is rooted in 
heuristic processes. Together, the increased salience of inherent facts and the increased relational 
complexity of extrinsic explanations lead people to oversample inherent facts when they produce 
explanations. In Study 3, I found that the salience of inherent facts leads people to over-rely on 
them when they construct explanations. In Studies 3 and 4, I found that even when participants 
were aware of the relationship between an environmental factor and a pattern under 
 57 
consideration—that is, when participants did not have to retrieve this variable—people still 
exhibited an inherence bias. However, I found that the inherence bias was reduced when people 
reflected on the explanandum longer (Studies 4 and 5) and among those with additional cognitive 
resources (older children compared to younger children; Studies 6 and 7). Together, these 
findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that domain-general cognitive constraints give rise 
to an inherence bias in scientific explanation that is rooted in heuristic processes. 
Finally, I provided evidence for an inherence bias even among practicing scientists. I 
found that early explanations of major observations in the history of science—that is, the 
explanations produced by scientists who most closely resemble the position my naïve 
participants found themselves in—tended to be more inherent than subsequent explanations of 
the same observations. This work suggests that the inherence bias in scientific explanation I 
observed among naïve participants can even influence the explanations and theories of practicing 
scientists and sheds light on an important but as of yet unnoticed facet of early scientific 
explanations. 
To conclude, Brown peered through his microscope and observed pollen rapidly 
zigzagging about. He explained its motion as owing to “the particle itself.” This event embodies 
both naïve participants’ and early scientists’ explanatory strategy. Naïve participants, and even 
early scientists, appear to explain novel scientific observations more inherently than extrinsically 
and this tendency appears to be rooted in a heuristic cognitive process.  
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Appendix: Supplementary Materials and Analysis 
Validating the anomaly assumption 
Studies 1 – 5 provide evidence for an inherence bias in scientific explanation that is 
rooted in heuristic processing. However, in all of these studies I have assumed that anomalies 
should lead to more extrinsic and less inherent responding. To validate this assumption, I directly 
tested whether claiming that an observation is an anomalies does indeed reduce inherent 
explanations.    
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 99 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who were paid 
$0.60 for participating in the study. An additional participant was recruited but indicated they 
were not paying attention and so were excluded from analyses.  
Materials and Procedures. I presented participants with fictitious scientific observations 
(all vignettes taken from Study 5) that only differed in whether the vignette stated that the 
experienced scientists were surprised by the observation in question (Anomaly Condition) or 
merely noted it (No Anomaly Condition) (Condition: within subjects). Participants read each 
vignette and then chose which of four explanations (two inherent and two extrinsic) best 
explained the observation. Participants were provided with additional explanation options in 
order to address the concern that the particular response options I provided in Studies 3 and 4 
increased the inherence bias. An example vignette is shown below:  
Anomaly Condition: A group of experienced biologists wanted to observe the mating 
behavior of the Siberian Nyctereutes dogs’ first offspring. Typically, dogs have multiple 
mates over the course of their lives. Surprisingly, these biologists observed that the first 
offspring of the Nyctereutes dog maintained one mate for its entire life. 
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No Anomaly Condition: A group of experienced biologists wanted to observe the 
mating behavior of the Siberian Nyctereutes dogs’ first offspring. Dogs often have at 
least one mate over the course of their lives. These biologists observed that the first 
offspring of the Nyctereutes dog maintained one mate for most of its life. 
 
Results 
 To confirm the assumption in Studies 1 – 5, I fit a Bayesian logistic mixed-effects model 
predicting inherent explanation choices (1 = Inherent, 0 = Extrinsic) based on condition 
assignment (1 = No Anomaly condition, 0 = Anomaly condition) with random intercepts for both 
subject and vignette. Consistent with my prior assumptions, the Anomaly condition (86% 
inherent) led to less inherent responding than did the No Anomaly condition (93% inherent), 
suggesting that participants recognize—at least upon reflection—that anomalous behavior is 
inconsistent with an inherent explanation of that behavior. 
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Figure 12. The mean proportion of inherent explanations for novel scientific observations by 
condition. Error bars represent 50% Credible Intervals.  
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Table 11 
Bayesian logistic mixed-effects regression predicting proportion of inherent explanations on the 
basis of condition. 
Population-Level 
Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
Intercept 3.21 .93 4,349 1.45 5.11 1 
Condition 1.12 .36 14,000 .44 1.85 1 
Group-Level Effects Estimate Error Effective Steps 95% CI r̂ 
SD(Subject) 2.10 .42 4,239 1.38 3.03 1 
SD(Vignette) 1.69 .94 4,720 .62 4.14 1 
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Table 12 
Examples of additional fictitious vignettes with sample explanations and coded responses 
Fictitious 
Observation Domain Vignette Text Sample Inherent Explanation Sample Extrinsic Explanation 
 Chemistry Chemists in a lab high in the Colorado Rockies 
were investigating the possibility of storing 
hydrogen atoms in lithium nitride crystals. In a 
strange turn of events, these chemists found 
that when they attempted to store the hydrogen 
atoms in the lithium nitrides crystalline 
structures, it led to a result that completely 
defied their expectations. Instead of the 
lithium nitride structure storing 15% of 
hydrogen atoms, the crystaline structures 
stored 0% of hydrogen atoms. This is despite 
the fact that these scientists had more than 40 
years of experience between them working 
with lithium nitride. 
“The lithium nitrides crystallines 
struture are not homogenous 
enough to store the hydrogen 
atoms.” 
 “The atoms in the lithium nitride 
might have repelled the 
Hydrogen atoms. Perhaps all of 
the bonds that could be made 
have already been made, and so 
any outside protons and electrons 
would be repelled no matter. 
Another possibility is that the 
lithium nitride is storing another 
atom without the scientists 
realizing it.” 
“The altitude may have caused 
the hydrogen atoms not to be 
able to be stored in the lithium 
structures.” 
“The environment did not 
facilitate storage.” 
 Physics A group of experienced physicists were 
looking to create thermal solar panels for use 
in urban environments. These physicists were 
conducting field measurements of 
experimental solar panels in a densely 
populated square of Beijing, China. Typically, 
their panels are capable of converting 75% of 
the energy they absorb into usable power. 
Surprisingly, when they measured the 
conversion of energy into usable power, they 
noticed that the experimental solar panels 
were converting nearly 90% of the power they 
received into usable energy. 
 
 
“The panels were better 
constructed then they believed 
and this accounted for the better 
results.” 
“The solar panels must simply be 
more efficient at solar energy 
conversion.” 
   
 
 
“Perhaps the buildings in the 
dense area were built of a 
material that helped the solar 
panels capture more energy.” 
“In china there are a lot of 
skyscrapers that will refract 
the better, making more 
energy for the solar panels” 
 Biology A group of experienced biologists wanted to 
observe the rare Nyctereutes dogs’ mating 
behavior. These biologists were working in the 
forests of Siberia, the Nyctereutes dogs’ 
habitat. Typically, dogs have multiple mates 
over the course of their lives. Surprisingly, 
these biologists observed that 
the Nyctereutes dogs maintained one life-long 
mate for most of their lives. 
“the dogs probably feel that 
they'd rather be with someone 
they are loyal to.” 
“Maybe they have a different 
gene in them that allows them to 
be more loyal to their mating 
partner. Something different than 
what other dogs have, like 
crabs.” 
“Maybe this group of dogs 
were a isolated from the 
standard pack of dogs and it 
changed.” 
“Because they live in a remote 
area, this particular dog has 
greater bonds with their mates 
because there are not a lot of 
other choices and therefore 
stays with the same mate.” 
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Table 13 
Examples of additional children’s vignettes with sample explanations and coded responses 
Domain Vignette Text Sample Inherent Explanation Sample Extrinsic Explanation 
Chemistry 
Daxy water is really cold and found deep underground 
in a salt-cave [show pictures]. The place that daxy 
water is found in is a really salty cave, way saltier than 
most caves! Now, you know how water turns to ice 
when it’s cold outside? Well, daxy water is really cold 
but it still doesn’t turn to ice. Daxy water doesn’t turn 
to ice, even though it is really, really cold. Don’t you 
think that’s cool!? What’s really amazing is that daxy 
water is like other water in every other way, so it’s 
really strange that it doesn’t turn to ice when it’s really 
cold. 
“Maybe it's because it's a special 
kind of water that only lives in caves 
and it has a special chemical to it that 
makes it not freeze.” 
“Because the daxy water is already 
cold that’s why it never gets turned 
into ice.” 
“Because it's in a cave, instead 
of outside where it should be, 
the other water turns to ice 
because it's not protected.” 
“because of the salt in the 
cave.” 
Physics 
An astronaut standing on the Moon wanted to do a 
really cool experiment [show picture]. They dropped a 
blarky hammer and a wuggy feather at the same time to 
see which would hit the ground first [show picture]. 
Well, the astronaut found that the blarky hammers and 
the wuggy feather hit the ground at the same time, even 
though these were like regular hammers and feathers in 
every other way. The blarky hammer and the wuggy 
feather hit the ground at the same time! Don’t you think 
that’s cool!? What’s really amazing is that the blarky 
hammer and the wuggy feather are like other hammers 
and feathers in every other way, so it’s really strange 
that they hit the ground at the same time.  
“Maybe because they way the same 
pounds and um they um have like the 
same um like weight or something. 
They weigh maybe 50 pounds the 
same.” 
“Because they're the same weight” 
“Because there is no gravity on 
the moon.” 
“So it's gravity, on the moon in 
space, so they dropped at the 
same time, even though on 
earth there's gravity, but there 
isn't gravity so it feels the same 
weight.” 
    
Biology 
There is a wild dog called a tyco dog that lives in the 
coldest part of Alaska [show pictures]. The forest that 
this dog lives in is really cold, way colder than most 
places! Now, you know how most dogs have pink 
tongues? Well, this kind of dog has a striped tongue, 
even though it’s like other dogs in every other way. 
The tyco dog has a striped tongue! Don’t you think 
that’s cool!? What’s really amazing is that the tyco dog 
is like other dogs in every other way, so it’s really 
strange that it has a striped tongue. 
 
“Because it is the wildest creature in 
world.” 
“I think it's because it needs to have 
a difference from other dogs. So I 
don't think it’s a normal dog.” 
“I think that the Tyco dog has a 
striped tongue because it is half 
really cold because the forest is 
really cold sometimes isn't cold 
too because it has shelter.” 
“It has a striped tongue because 
um Alaska on the rocks the 
snow kind of makes kind of 
striped lines.” 
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Table 14 
Examples of historical vignettes with sample explanations and coded responses 
Historical 
Observation Domain Vignette Text Sample Inherent Explanation 
Sample Extrinsic 
Explanation 
 Chemistry A chemist conducted the following 
experiment: They applied heat to a piece 
of manganese and then weighed it, 
noting that the manganese had gained 
mass. This result was quite striking to 
the chemist. 
“The heat caused the manganese to 
expand due to the material the 
manganese is made of.” 
“The manganese expanded because 
heat was applied to it. Because the 
molecules were excited and started 
spreading apart. “  
 
“A chemical reaction 
occurred that changed air 
particles into physical 
additions to the original 
object.” 
“Heating the manganese 
created a chemical 
reaction between the 
metal and the oxygen 
combining the two.  
Therefore, the product had 
more mass at the end.” 
 Physics A physicist performed the following 
experiment: They fired a cannonball at a 
target 1000 meters to the north. The 
physicist noticed that the cannonball 
curved right of the target repeatedly even 
though there was no wind that day and 
the cannon was perfectly straight. This 
result was quite striking to the physicist. 
“The cannon ball might have not be 
perfectly round.” 
“The cannonball is not smooth. 
There is an indentation on one side 
that is making it pull to one side in 
flight.” 
“Rotation of the Earth” 
 
“I would guess that the 
rotation of the earth is 
affecting the trajectory of 
the cannonball.” 
 
 Biology A biologist conducted the following 
study: The biologist placed pollen from 
the Clarkia pulchella flower in water 
under a microscope and observed it. The 
biologist noticed that the bits of pollen 
were vigorously moving around despite 
the fact that the pollen had been place in 
storage for months. This result was quite 
striking to the biologist. 
 
“The bits of pollen had not died 
during the storage period.” 
“The pollen moved around because 
it was from a living organism, the 
Clarkia pulchella flower. Despite 
being put in storage, the pollen was 
not impacted by that.” 
“The water was moving.” 
“The microbes in the 
water reacted to the pollen 
and resulted in the motion. 
Or something in the 
pollen was reacting to the 
water.” 
 
